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“TRESPASS” TO MOVABLES? SAY NO MORE.
MCI COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC. V. HAGAN
AND LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 2315
Bill Hudson *
Answering a certified question from the U.S. Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently refused to
recognize the tort of trespass to chattels, declaring instead that the
claim at issue was governed by the general delictual liability
provision of Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.
I. BACKGROUND
MCI Communications maintained claims of trespass and
negligence against co-defendants Hagan and Joubert in federal
court. 1 The suit arose after an MCI fiber optic cable, a portion of
which ran underground Hagan’s property, was cut, allegedly by
Joubert while operating a backhoe on Hagan’s land. 2 At trial, MCI
attempted to demonstrate the defendants’ negligence by claiming
noncompliance with the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act. 3
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1. Verizon Business Global initially brought the action, and MCI was
substituted when its ownership of the damaged movable was established. MCI
Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan, 641 F. 3d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 2011).
2. MCI Communications Service, 641 F. 3d at 114.
3. MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan, 74 So. 3d 1148, 1149,
1151 (La. 10/25/11). The Louisiana Underground Utilities and Facilities
Damage Prevention Law, or “Damage Prevention Act” as used by the court, LA.
REV. STAT. § 49:1749.11 et seq., provides among other things that “no person
shall excavate… near the location of an underground facility or utility… without
having first ascertained, in the manner prescribed in Subsection B of this
Section, the specific location as provided in R.S. 40:1749.14(D) of all
underground facilities or utilities in the area which would be affected by the
proposed excavation or demolition.” LA. REV. STAT. § 49:1749.13(A).
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The trial court found that MCI had only a contractual right for
its cable to run through Hagan’s property according to the sale
terms when Hagan purchased the land, and not a servitude. A jury
found the co-defendants had not acted negligently. 4 Based on these
findings, the trial judge declined, over MCI’s objection, to instruct
the jury, in essence: “A Defendant may be held liable for an
inadvertent trespass resulting from an intentional act.” 5
Reviewing the case on MCI’s appeal, the U.S. Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned that, without a servitude in MCI’s
favor, no trespass to land could have occurred. Although, finding
enough evidence to establish Joubert had severed the cable while
intentionally operating the backhoe, the Fifth Circuit believed
“MCI may [have been] entitled to have the jury instructed on the
claim of trespass to chattels.” 6 Having been presented with no
Louisiana Supreme Court decision on the requisite intent for
“trespass to chattels” (or in regard to the very existence of that tort
in Louisiana), 7 the Court of Appeals certified to the State Supreme
Court the question:
Is the proposed jury instruction in this case, which states
that “[a] Defendant may be held liable for an inadvertent
trespass resulting from an intentional act,” a correct
statement of Louisiana law when the trespass at issue is the
severing of an underground cable located on property
owned by one of the alleged trespassors [sic], and the
property is not subject to a servitude by the owners of the
underground cable but only to the contractual right to keep
it, as an existing cable, underneath the property? 8

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

MCI Communications Services, 74 So. 3d at 1151.
Id.
MCI Communications Services, 641 F. 3d at 115.
MCI Communications Services, 74 So. 3d at 1152.
MCI Communications Services, 641 F. 3d at 116.
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II. LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT DECISION
To reply to the Fifth Circuit, the Louisiana Supreme Court
framed the issue as “whether Louisiana law recognizes a distinct
tort of ‘trespass to chattels’ and, if so, can a ‘trespass to chattels’
be committed inadvertently if it results from an otherwise
intentional act.” 9 The court first noted an important distinction
between trespass to chattels and the facts of the Hagan case:
relying on Black’s Law Dictionary, legal scholars, and The
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 10 the court concluded that “the
common law claim of trespass to chattels appears to require intent
to interfere with another’s interest in movable property before an
action for trespass to chattels may lie.” 11
The court then concluded that, regardless of the presence or
absence of intent, an owner of movable property damaged by
another “has an adequate remedy under the law of tort without
recourse to the common law trespass to chattels” under the
broadly-phrased Louisiana Civil Code article 2315(A)—“[e]very
act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it.” 12 A remedy under article
2315 does not preclude evidence of a defendant’s noncompliance
with the Damage Prevention Act, since, even though “a violation
of the statute does not result in either strict civil liability or
negligence per se,” ignoring the duty to locate “an underground
utility as required by statute subjects the excavator to delictual
liability under the theory of negligence, and any statutory violation
is considered in the traditional duty-risk analysis.” 13 MCI’s
proposed jury instruction was thus “not a correct statement of
Louisiana law.” 14

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1153-1154 & n.8-10.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1155 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315(A)).
Id. at 1155.
Id.
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III. COMMENTARY
Hagan is a key illustration of the basic difference in how
the common law and the civil law remedy damages. The decision
underlines, and will doubtlessly help to preserve, Louisiana’s civil
law tradition.
The question certified by the Fifth Circuit appears to have
resulted from MCI’s ignoring Louisiana’s encompassing codal
framework for remedying damages, and needlessly pinning its case
to a “trespass” theory. Presented with the issue of trespass, the
Fifth Circuit wondered whether a certain type of trespass theory—
trespass to chattels—was applicable to the claim.
At common law, a claim for damage to movable property
would involve a more particularized claim centered on one or more
specific theories of recovery, since common law tort suits,
traceable to old writs, 15 are maintained under theories of recovery
connected to specific sets of facts. 16 The task of fitting the right
theory with its corresponding elements to an injury-causing
occurrence can become highly technical: regarding cases of
damage to buried utility lines, Prosser and Keeton note that the
intent element alone produces contention in the fact-specific
inquiries surrounding trespass to chattels claims. 17 By contrast,
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 gives legal effect to a general
principle, as is characteristic of codal law, 18 that there may be a
remedy for any act which causes damage, thus removing the

15. 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES: THE LAW OF
TORTS 127, 162 (2d ed. 2011) (brief background of writs for trespasses to land
and personal property).
16. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 211 (2000);
(Common law “could not, and did not, subsequently modernize itself, in terms
of overall expression…. [T]here is still a law of torts (the plural is important)
since there were no general principles of liability in England, only given
wrongs…”) Id. at 217.
17. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 86 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
18. GLENN, supra note 16 at 126; see generally, Alain Levasseur, On the
Structure of a Civil Code, 44 TUL. L. REV. 693 (1970).
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complexity of defining and recognizing specific torts claim-byclaim and fact-by-fact.
In Hagan, the State Supreme Court applied article 2315
literally, in accordance with the Code’s rule of interpretation:
“When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not
lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written
and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of
the legislature.” 19 The court recognized article 2315’s capacity to
remedy damage, and it prevented the adoption of a common law
theory which, given its historical application, could have become
the basis for tort liability for trespass alone, even when trespass
does not produce damages. 20
In his treatise on Louisiana tort law, Professor William E.
Crawford states, “The fact of trespass in itself is not an actionable
civil wrong, contrary to the common law. All actions for trespass
under Louisiana law have involved damage done by the trespasser
after or in the course of the trespass.” 21 Indeed, under the
reasoning of cases like Dickie's Sportsman's Centers, Inc. v.
Department of Transp. & Dev., an action in trespass without
damages would be absurd in Louisiana:
In the assessment of damages arising out of trespass, the
trial court has much discretion. The damage, however, must
be certain, and the discretion exercised only to the extent of
the damage and ascertained from all the facts and
circumstances. 22
Without damage, there can be no recovery; therefore, there is
no “tort” in the sense of “[a] civil wrong, other than breach of
contract, for which a remedy may be obtained.” 23 The simple
19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9.
20. KEETON ET AL., supra note 17 at 67.
21. WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TORT
LAW 242 (2d ed. 2009).
22. Dickie's Sportsman's Centers, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 477 So.
2d 744, 751 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 1985) (citations in original omitted).
23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1626 (9th ed. 2009).
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solution in Hagan is a consistent application of these concepts: a
claim for trespass to movable property cannot stand alone and
apart from a claim for damages; thus Civil Code article 2315
governs actions where there is damage resulting from trespass.
Trespass as recognized in Louisiana appears to be a tort
almost completely anticipated by the broad wording of article
2315. It would seem that filing a suit “for trespass” should be
effectively unnecessary in Louisiana, since a “suit for damages
pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2315” would likely be a more
accurate description. Even trespass accompanied by the conversion
of trees on another’s property, the distinctive instance where
interference with private property gives rise to enhanced damages
in Louisiana, is governed by statute, and not fact-specific common
law theory. 24 Where trespass is concerned, the language of the
Civil Code, while broad, does not seem to need court-created
factors “borrowed from the common law of torts” to substantially
clarify how liability is to be proven, as opposed to concepts like
“assault, battery, false imprisonment…[, and] negligence,” in
regards to which the common law has been readily enlisted to
define essential elements. 25 Rather, a plaintiff in a trespass action
succeeds by proving what the Code plainly and simply requires:
damage caused by another’s act.
Yet how valuable is Hagan in “predict[ing] the path of
Louisiana tort law” 26 generally, or the direction of state law in its
entirety? The opinion seems at first glance a sweeping defense of
civilian methodology, insisting on reliance upon the Civil Code’s
language despite a common law theory which might more closely
fit the facts alleged, and reconciling a claim for damages to
24. LA. REV. STAT. § 3:4278.1; CRAWFORD, supra note 21.
25. Harriet Spiller Dagget et al., A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the
Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12, 32 (1937). See also, CRAWFORD,
supra note 21, at 22 (“The codal texts governing délit are so spare and general
that the court must as a practical matter write most of the tort law with its own
pen, though it is done in the name of interpretation.”).
26. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 24.
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movable property with statutory text. But the Louisiana trespass
claim might be rather unique even in Louisiana tort law for the
ease with which it can be understood and maintained. Proving
liability for other delicts in the state appears to require more
attention to the factors of specific wrongs, as evidenced by the
importation of common law elements to define many other torts. 27
Another indication of plain application of statutory language
being a less-than-universal principle is the wide discretion
exercised by Louisiana appellate courts in tort cases. Prof.
Crawford has identified forty-five key cases spanning twenty-four
years which represent the state judiciary’s independent
modifications of rules on such matters as strict liability,
prescription, and damages for mental and emotional suffering. 28
The old notion that “[t]here is no liability in this State for damages
sounding in tort except where such liability is expressly or
impliedly authorized by the codal articles and statutes of the
state” 29 seems unlikely to remain absolute when one reads a long
list of Louisiana appellate decisions illustrating “[l]iberalization of
tort liability by the Louisiana appellate courts.” 30
In Louisiana jurisprudence on other matters of law as well,
strict adherence to civil law principles has counterparts. While one
can identify close adherence to elementary civil law principles in a
number of court opinions, 31 there are others in which common law
doctrine seems about to summarily supplant existing statutory
principles. For instance, in the 2004 Louisiana Supreme Court
decision in Avenal v. State, the majority 32 and concurring 33
27. Dagget et al., supra note 25.
28. Id. at 25-30.
29. Martin v. Brown, 240 La. 674, 680 (La. 1960).
30. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 25.
31. See e.g., State ex rel. D.W., 865 So. 2d 45, 46 (La. 2004) (on statutory
construction); Gregor v. Argenot Great Cent. Ins. Co., 851 So. 2d 959, 964 n.6
(La. 2003) ("Legislation is superior to any other source of law and is a solemn
expression of legislative will."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sewerage &
Water Bd., 710 So. 2d 290, 292 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1998) (on sources of law).
32. Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1101-1102, 1108 n.28 (La. 2004);
John J. Costonis, Avenal v. State: Takings and Damagings in Louisiana, 65 LA.
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opinions suggested a common law public trust doctrine could be
applied in Louisiana, despite scholars’ conclusions that Louisiana’s
constitution and legislation might well serve the purposes met by
the public trust doctrine in other states. 34
However, despite any drifting away from the pure civil law
caused by Louisiana judicial decisions, 35 the delict akin to trespass
to chattels as concerned in Hagan seems particularly suited for
straightforward application of the Civil Code’s language, and thus
is unlikely to be complicated by judicial gloss in the future.
“Trespass” claims like that brought by MCI are suits for either
unauthorized intrusion upon another’s property, or damage to
another’s property. 36 Louisiana law does not remedy mere
unauthorized intrusions if no damage has resulted, and plainly
allows recovery when there is injury caused by another. Refusing
to recognize a specific action for trespass to chattels, the Louisiana
Supreme Court refused to complicate the plain meaning of article
2315 and the requirements for maintaining a suit for delictual
damages, and declined to expand unnecessarily state law through
jurisprudence. The court followed its charge from the legislature

L. REV. 1015, 1030 (2005) (“Justice Victory… announced… the public trustbased doctrine acknowledging the ‘right of the state to disperse fresh water…
over saltwater marshes in order to prevent coastal erosion.’”).
33. Avenal, 886 So. 2d 1085, at 1115 n.8 (Weimer, J., concurring).
34. Lee Hargrave, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Plea for Precision, 53 LA.
L. REV. 1535, 1541-1544 (1993); A. N. Yiannopoulos, Five Babes Lost in the
Tide—A Saga of Land Titles in Two States: Philips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1357, 1370 (1988).
35. The ultimate question, likely, is whether Louisiana courts have
sometimes looked completely beyond statutory law and proceeded according to
a kind of common law, or have acted within their authority under Civil Code
article 4: “When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from legislation
or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To decide
equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages.” This issue
cannot be fully examined here. However, the breadth of article 2315 in
sanctioning remedies for all damage-causing acts, as well as the public trust-like
statutory law of Louisiana, see e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 450-452, 455-456;
Hargrave, supra note 34, call into question the necessity of judicially-created
rules in cases to which this legislation would seem to apply.
36. MCI Communications Services, 74 So. 3d 1151.
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most exactly, applied what the Code clearly provides, and was
thereby true to the law, in principle and in letter.

